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This paper was originally presented to the International Conference on William James
and Pragmatism, 12-13 November 2010, University of Coimbra, Portugal.
1 Anyone  who has  looked  into  the  origins  of  pragmatism knows  the  story  of  William
James’s famous August 26, 1898 lecture to the Berkeley Philosophical Union in which he
publically introduced pragmatism by name for the first time and acknowledged Charles
Peirce as its father. James’s talk set the philosophical world abuzz and prodded Peirce to
take up his  pen to  write  about  pragmatism again after  many years  of  silence.1 How
Peirce’s pragmatism unfolded after James’s talk is my main subject but I will first briefly
characterize  Peirce’s  friendship  with  James  and  will  remark  on  the  present-day
resurgence of pragmatism.
2 Peirce and James met in 1861 when they were fellow students at Harvard’s Lawrence
Scientific School.  James was 19 years old.  Peirce,  who had already taken a bachelor’s
degree from Harvard, was 22. They soon became good friends. During the early years of
their friendship, Peirce was the dominant figure; not only was he older, but he already
had a reputation for genius and he seemed well on his way to a stellar career as a physical
scientist, while also being well regarded in Cambridge for his knowledge of logic and the
history  and  philosophy  of  science.  James,  on  the  other  hand,  had  abandoned  his
aspiration to become an artist when he entered the Lawrence Scientific School with a
view to becoming a doctor of medicine, and for much of the decade that followed he
remained  unsettled  over  his  career  choice  and  frequently  suffered  from  severe
depression. There is some anecdotal evidence that it was Peirce who persuaded James to
give up medicine and to take up psychology.2 It  is  true,  at  least,  that James publicly
acknowledged Peirce’s early influence on his career and was even once reported to have
said to his students that he owed “everything” to Peirce (Rukeyser 1942: 378).
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3 During their middle years, after James began teaching at Harvard in 1872 and until the
mid-1880’s when Peirce’s career began to unravel, it seemed that both men were destined
for  notable  success.  After  the  meetings  of  the  famous Cambridge Metaphysical  Club,
which met sometimes in Peirce’s study and sometimes in James’s, their lives diverged.
Peirce went to Washington D.C. as the assistant in charge of gravity determinations for
the United States Coast Survey3 and he frequently traveled to sites in North America and
Europe to conduct scientific experiments. From 1879 to 1884 he lived in Baltimore where
he taught logic part-time at the new Johns Hopkins University while also continuing to
work for the Coast Survey. Peirce had already achieved international renown for his work
in geodesy and in logic. James, too, traveled to Europe during those years but he made his
home in Cambridge and continued at Harvard, where in 1874 he established the first
psychology laboratory in the United States. In 1880, James was appointed to Harvard’s
philosophy department and after that taught both philosophy and psychology. On his
travels he met leading European psychologists and philosophers, including Carl Stumpf,
Ernst Mach, and Wilhelm Wundt. James was a charismatic man who, unlike Peirce, made
friends easily; his renown and influence quickly spread.
4 After Peirce lost his appointment at Johns Hopkins in 1884, and later his assistantship in
the Coast Survey, James became the dominant figure in their friendship, writing letters of
recommendation for academic appointments for Peirce, procuring lectures for him, and
finally even establishing a small but crucial privately funded pension for him. Two of the
most important series of lectures of Peirce’s career, his Cambridge Conferences Lectures
of 1898 and his Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism of 1903, were arranged for by James. Not
only did these lectures provide rare public venues for Peirce’s mature philosophy, they
also provided critically needed income. Peirce’s brother, James Mills, wrote to James that
the 1903 Harvard Lectures helped save Peirce from ruin (EP2: xxiv).4 On the day following
the conclusion of the Harvard Lectures, Peirce added “Santiago” as his second middle
name, apparently to honor James for his faithful support.
5 As a matter of human interest, these connections between Peirce and James are engaging,
and it is intriguing that there are still many mysteries and hidden chapters in the story of
their friendship. I think one of the most obscure facets of the Peirce-James story is how
and to what extent they influenced each other intellectually. What did they learn from
each other and how did they help shape each other’s key ideas? How much did they
collaborate? There are no widely accepted answers to these questions and it is doubtful if
there ever will  be any definitive answers because surviving documentary evidence is
scant  and  can  be  interpreted,  and  has  been  interpreted,  in  conflicting  ways.
Notwithstanding their long friendship, there has been a tendency among historians of
ideas to downplay their influence on each other. Students of Peirce and James usually
seem more inclined to flesh out  their  disagreements than their  agreements,  perhaps
especially  when  it  comes  to  their  pragmatisms.  The  story  of  Peirce  renaming  his
pragmatism with the less agreeable name, pragmaticism, is well known, and it is usually
said that Peirce took this step to distance himself from James (and from others who were
in the James camp). While there is certainly some truth to this, I believe there was an
interesting interplay of ideas at work in the development of Peirce’s and James’s late
pragmatisms just as there had been in the early Metaphysical Club days. In particular, I
believe that Peirce’s  late pragmatism, while distinct from James’s  in important ways,
bears  evidence  of  James’s  influence  –  at  least  it  becomes  more  Jamesian  in  certain
respects. The reference in my title to Peirce’s post-Jamesian pragmatism is to what is
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usually called Peirce’s  late pragmatism – the pragmatism that  emerged after  James’s
landmark 1898 Berkeley lecture.
6 I should point out that I am not only concerned with history but also with issues about
pragmatism that bear on philosophy today. It is widely acknowledged, even by those who
do not welcome it, that pragmatism is on the rise. I do welcome it, but I know that from
its earliest days pragmatism has had its detractors, and that is as true today as it was a
hundred years ago. But whether we like it or not, pragmatism can no longer be dismissed
as of only historical interest. This is evident from the large number of recent articles and
books about pragmatism as well as from the fact that a number of journals and centers
have sprung up in recent years to advance pragmatism studies. Of special note is the
increasing number of international conferences on pragmatism which attests not only to
the present-day interest in pragmatism but also to the fact that no matter how American
it might have been in its origins, pragmatism belongs to the world.
7 Among those who have written about the resurgence of pragmatism, some go so far as to
say that it could become the dominant philosophical approach of 21st century.5 One such
scholar is Richard Bernstein, whose work stands out because of his confidence in the
continuing, even in part still untapped, relevance of the classical pragmatists, especially
Peirce, James, and Dewey. Bernstein is adamant that Peirce is the father of pragmatism
but he dismisses the usual claim that pragmatism was born in 1877-78 in the pages of the
Popular Science Monthly where Peirce introduced his famous pragmatic maxim, or in the
earlier private meetings of the Metaphysical Club. Bernstein argues that pragmatism was
really born in 1868 in the pages of Peirce’s Journal  of  Speculative Philosophy papers,  in
which Peirce argued that all thought is in signs and where he made a strong case against
intuitive cognition.6 James,  still  in Medical  School  at  Harvard in 1868,  found Peirce’s
papers to be “exceedingly bold” and “subtle” but also, at that time, “incomprehensible,”
and he claimed that Peirce’s attempt at elucidating them for him privately hadn’t helped
much; nevertheless, he said he found them “strangely” interesting (Richardson 2006: 95).
But if Peirce got the pragmatism ball rolling, as it were, it was soon picked up by others.
Bernstein readily acknowledges the massive contributions of James and Dewey and he
argues that there has been a more-or-less continuous development of pragmatism since
its  beginning  with  the  upshot  that  pragmatic  themes  have  come  to  dominate
contemporary philosophy. Bernstein thinks that Putnam, Rorty, and Jürgen Habermas
have been the key players in shaping pragmatism in recent years (Bernstein 2010: xi). (As
an  aside,  I  think  we  all  know  that  John  Dewey  was  the  key  player  in  extending
pragmatism’s first wave beyond the lifetimes of Peirce and James but that is a story for
another time.)
8 Unlike Bernstein, some promoters of pragmatism downplay, or even deny, the continuing
relevance of the classical pragmatists.7 I believe that is partly the result of differences of
opinion  about  what  pragmatism  is.  We  know,  for  example,  that  in  some  circles
pragmatism is regarded as a methodology and in other circles as an epistemology. Some
focus on the social and political ramifications of pragmatist thought. Many, including
Bernstein, identify pragmatism with a distinctive assemblage of attitudes and ideas – a
characteristic  ethos.  That  is  why  Bernstein  can  hold  that  the  birth  of  pragmatism
properly began in 1868 with Peirce’s “radical critique” of Cartesianism and not with the
1878 publication of his pragmatic maxim (Bernstein 2010: ix, 35). It is well known that as
early as 1908, only ten years after James’s Berkeley lecture, Arthur Lovejoy identified
thirteen different varieties of pragmatism, and nearly everyone supposes that now, more
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than  a  hundred  years  later,  a  great  many  more  could  be  added.  Certainly  what
pragmatism is,  is  a  serious  question,  but  it  cannot  be  treated  thoroughly  here  and,
besides,  as  I  have  pointed  out  elsewhere,8 one  does  not  have  to  know exactly  what
pragmatism is in order to be a pragmatist philosopher just as one does not have to know
clearly what analytic philosophy is or what continental philosophy is to be an analytic or
a continental philosopher. Nevertheless, it will help if we stake out a position, even if only
provisionally, and toward that end it will be useful to take a hint from Tom Burke, who
has been trying to sort out contemporary conceptions of pragmatism and to establish
some norms for the legitimate use of the name.9
9 Contrary  to  Bernstein’s  claim  that  the  importance  of  Peirce’s  maxim  has  been
exaggerated (Bernstein 2010: 35), Burke argues that along with a characteristic normative
conception of belief, it “is the key to understanding what pragmatism is” (Burke 2010: 2),
but  that  there are two interestingly different  ways to utilize  the maxim:  a  semantic
approach which gives an operationalist account of meaning and “emphasizes interactions
with  objects  falling  under  a  given  concept”  and  an  inferentialist  approach  which
“emphasizes repercussions of  beliefs upon other beliefs and,  respectively,  upon one’s
subsequent  conduct  –  requiring  a  functional,  inferential-role  account  of  word
meaning”(Burke, forthcoming). According to Burke, Peirce held the semantic approach
and James the inferentialist approach. Burke points out that in recent times (at least since
Rorty brought pragmatism back into vogue) the inferentialist approach, deriving from
James, has become dominant to the point of having nearly eclipsed the operationalist
orientation of Peirce. Robert Brandom, once Rorty’s student, is probably now the leading
proponent  of  inferentialism  and  his  work  has  become  the  main  entry  point  for
philosophers  from  the  analytic  tradition  who  want  to  find  out  about  pragmatism
(although I must enter the caveat that Brandom’s inferentialism is not a simple matter
and is not equivalent to any of its antecedents). Burke notes that little attention has been
given  to  developing  an  authentic  Peirce-inspired  pragmatist  semantics  focusing  on
actions and sensible effects to replace the standard empiricist semantics that focuses on
“things and sets.” He believes that the almost unanimous embrace of inferentialism has
seriously weakened pragmatism which should be a two-pronged approach incorporating
both operationalist and inferentialist stances.10
10 I think Burke somewhat exaggerates the extent to which Peirce and James held exclusive
views.11 It may be acceptable to regard James’s approach to pragmatism as principally
inferentialist,  since  his  concessions  to  Peirce’s  more  operationalist  renderings  of  his
maxim seem somewhat pro forma. As Burke says, for James, Peirce’s maxim “is more than
just a methodological maxim” and among the consequences James seems most eager to
consider are a conception’s effects on our overall store of beliefs (Burke 2010).12 This does
seem to put James in the inferentialist  camp. But to limit Peirce to the semantic,  or
operationalist, approach seems mistaken – even though it is by no means a mistake to
count him in the operationalist camp. It  is  well-known that Peirce’s maxim was first
published in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” the second of his famous 1877-78 set of
pragmatism papers.13 In its original form it went as follows: “Consider what effects, which
might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to
have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object”
(EP1:  132).  Among  the  illust-  rations  Peirce  gave  for  using  his  maxim  were  his
clarifications of “hard” as the character of something that can withstand being scratched
by most  substances  without  scoring,  and of  “weight” or  “heavy” as  characteristic  of
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something that, “in the absence of opposing force, will fall” (EP1: 133). What we mean by
these conceptions consists exclusively in what we would expect to experience in certain
kinds of interactions with the objects conceived of. Years later, when Peirce returned to
his maxim, he said that “if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental
phenomena which the affirmation or  denial  of  a  concept  could imply,  one will  have
therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it” (EP2:
332),  and,  in illustration,  he said that  by “lithium” we mean a mineral  with specific
observable characteristics which, if  subjected to procedures described in textbooks of
chemistry, will yield distinctive observable results. Peirce went into considerable detail in
“prescribing what [one must] do in order to gain a perceptual acquaintance with the
object of the word” lithium (EP2: 286) and indeed, as Burke points out, this is clearly an
operationalist  account  of  meaning.  Harvard physicist,  Percy W. Bridgman,  is  credited
with developing the idea of operational meaning, which he defined as follows: “we mean
by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with
the corresponding set of operations […] the true meaning of a term is to be found by
observing what a man does with it, not what he says about it” (Bridgman 1927: 5-7). It is
easy to see why Burke describes Peirce’s approach as operationalist; others have noticed
this as well. Dewey’s friend and collaborator, Arthur Bentley, more than once pointed out
to Bridgman that he was following a path laid down by Peirce.14
11 But does this mean that Peirce could not also have been in some significant respect an
inferentialist? Brandom, in his engaging “Tales of the Mighty Dead,” seems to deny it
(Brandom 2002: 32), but one can’t help doubting that Brandom has read Peirce with care.
Even  a  careful  reading  of  Peirce’s  maxim  reveals  an  emphasis  on  the  conceptual
groundedness of pragmatic meaning: our conception of an object involves our conception of
effects which might conceivably have practical bearings. Meaning concerns the relation of
objects to experiential consequences, to be sure, but it does so only in the context of a
network of conceptions or beliefs. If we dig deeper and look backward to Peirce’s 1868
Journal  of  Speculative Philosophy papers,  and regard them as the original  manifesto for
pragmatism, as Bernstein recommends, and as I quite agree we should, then it is apparent
that Peirce held an inferentialist theory of cognition.15 In his recent book, The Pragmatic
Turn, Bernstein points out that in these early 1868 papers Peirce attacked Descartes’ claim
that there are two distinct kinds of knowledge, direct and indirect or, in other words,
immediate and inferential (Bernstein 2010: 39). Peirce questioned whether there really is
immediate cognition,  which he called intuition,  and concluded that there is  no good
reason to assume that there is. Peirce’s famous declaration that all thought is in signs,
something I will say more about in a moment, amounted to a denial that we have intuitive
knowledge and a claim that all knowledge requires inferential processing. Now it might
be objected that this is not enough to count Peirce an inferentialist according to the
current  understanding  of  inferentialism  and  I  concede  that  there  is  merit  in  this
objection. But Bernstein strongly disagrees with Brandom’s assessment of the American
Pragmatic  Tradition  as  belonging  outside  the  inferentialist  camp and  he  notes,
specifically, that Brandom “fails to recognize that Peirce’s pragmatism is a normative
pragmatism that is based upon an inferential semantics” (Bernstein 2010: 103).16 To what
extent Peirce explicitly thought of his 1877-78 pragmatism in the context of his 1868
inferentialist framework is difficult to say but the fact that he was so careful to emphasize
that his maxim was concerned with conceptions and conceivability leads one to believe
that he could hardly have missed the link between his pragmatism and his 1868 sign
theory of cognition. Peirce’s semiotic theory of mind was always the background theory
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for his pragmatism, but it would be many more years before he would make this link
explicit.
12 In light of these considerations, I believe that Burke’s claim that Peirce was primarily a
semantic operationalist and James an inferentialist is misleading because at least Peirce
employed  both  approaches,  but  that  does  not  weaken Burke’s  central  point  that  an
adequate  conception  of  pragmatism  should  accord  with  both  operationalist  and
inferentialist readings of the pragmatic maxim. Furthermore, even though Burke’s two-
pronged approach does not cleanly demarcate the pragmatisms of Peirce and James, he
may still  be  correct  in  thinking  that  the  most  complete  and satisfactory  account  of
original pragmatism is a synthesis of Peirce’s and James’s views.17 But more interesting, I
think, is that Burke’s conception of a two-pronged pragmatism points to the very factor
which, over time, led Peirce to explicitly reformulate his pragmatism in semiotic terms.
That is what I will turn to now and then I’ll briefly consider the role William James may
have played in moving Peirce to a richer conception of pragmatism.
13 The factor I have in mind is the dual reference implicit in every sign and, therefore, in
every concept of intellectual purport. Every sign fundamentally consists of a temporally
based  triadic  relation  in  which  it,  the  sign,  mediates  between  its  object  and  its
interpretant and therefore may be said to refer to both. The key to intelligence and the
acquisition  of  knowledge  is  semiosis,  or  sign  action,  whereby  interpretants  are
determined indirectly by their referent objects through the mediation of the operative
sign.18 Peirce’s denial of intuition was partly based on his argument that interpretants
cannot arise directly from their objects, dyadically, without mediation. All of these ideas
Peirce  had  developed  by  1868.  But  not-withstanding  the  inferentialism  implied  by
Peirce’s denial of intuitive knowledge, made stronger by his anticipation of inferential
role semantics (Bernstein 2010: 103-4), his early classification of signs into icons, indexes,
and symbols focused on the relation of signs to their objects without explicit reference to
interpretants.  His  more-or-less  exclusive  attention  to  the  sign-object  relation  does
suggest  that  Peirce’s  focus  of  concern,  even in  1868,  was  mainly  semantic,  which is
consistent with Burke’s interpretation of Peirce’s early pragmatism.
14 Beginning in the mid-1880’s, Peirce turned his attention to his scientific metaphysics,
especially his theory of categories, and his realism became progressively more robust.
Previously  he  had  ascribed  reality  only  to  relations  and  generals  (belonging  to  his
category of thirdness) but he came to ascribe reality also to actions and reactions of
existents (belonging to his category of secondness) and, finally, to the realm of feeling
and possibles (belonging to his category of firstness). These changes expanded Peirce’s
ontology and enriched his theory of signs by increasing the range of possible semiosis.
Peirce eventually came to see that feelings and actions, as well as conceptions, could be
proper correlates of sign relations, either as objects or as interpretants.
15 Peirce also expanded his semiotic theory in other ways. The early simple account of the
fundamental sign relation as a triadic relation between an object, sign, and interpretant
grew into a more complex account involving two kinds of objects, one immediate (the
object as the sign represents it) and one dynamic (the external object that determines the
sign), and three kinds of interpretants, one immediate (the interpretant as represented
by  the  sign),  one  dynamic  (the  actual  effect  produced  by  the  sign),  and  a  final
interpretant  (the  habit  that  exhausts  the  function  of  the  sign).  Until 1903  the  only
division of signs Peirce employed was the famous icon, index, symbol division19 which
marks how signs are related to the objects they represent, either by virtue of similarity,
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existential connection, or convention. But from 1903 on he considered the sign relation
from many new angles and worked out new divisions. First he added a division to account
for the different ways signs can be interpreted from the standpoint of his categories –
either as signs of possibility, fact,  or reason. This is the rhemes, dicisigns, arguments
division.20 Then he added a division to account for  what  signs are in themselves,  or
materially – either qualities, existents, or laws.21 This is the qualisigns, sinsigns, legisigns
division. From these three divisions, Peirce worked out ten classes of signs. Eventually he
added seven more divisions yielding, altogether, sixty-six classes of signs (but he still
thought there was room for improvement).
16 The final division of signs in Peirce’s extended system distinguished signs according to
the  nature  of  the  assurance  they  afforded  their  interpreters.  Abducent  signs  afford
assurance by instinct or, we might say, by an evolved attunement to nature. Inducents
afford assurance by experience. Deducents afford assurance by form. All three types of
assurance  correspond  to  types  of  inference  (abduction,  induction,  or  deduction)
confirming that in Peirce’s opinion all semiosis, and therefore all cognition, is inferential.
22
17 There is  much more in Peirce’s  semiotic  that  has  relevance for  the evolution of  his
pragmatism but I’ll only mention one further matter: its partition into three branches.
The dual reference of signs to objects and interpretants is the key to how Peirce divides
up his study of signs. The first branch, speculative grammar, deals mainly with syntax
and is concerned with signs per se, focusing on the necessary and sufficient conditions for
signhood or on what is  requisite for representation of  any kind.  The second branch,
speculative critic, deals with the relations of signs to the objects they represent. Its focus
is  on semantic  questions such as  reference,  truth conditions,  and validity.  The third
branch is speculative rhetoric, which deals with the relations of signs to their users (or to
their interpretants). In his one article on rhetoric, Peirce wrote that “the most essential
business” of speculative rhetoric “is to ascertain by logical analysis, greatly facilitated by
the  development  of  the  other  branches  of  [semiotic],  what  are  the  indispensable
conditions of a sign’s acting to determine another sign nearly equivalent to itself” (EP2:
328). The focus of this branch is on the pragmatic and rhetorical aspects of semiosis.23
18 The  point  of  my  digression  on  Peirce’s  semiotic  was  to  elaborate  on  Tom  Burke’s
recommendation  that  pragmatism  should  be  explicated  in  both  an  operationalist
framework and an inferentialist framework and how this two-pronged approach points to
the factor that led Peirce to reformulate his pragmatism in semiotic terms. That factor
was the dual reference of every conception and the need for multiple frameworks for
fully explicating meaning. Burke fused Peirce’s operationalist reading of his pragmatic
maxim with James’s inferentialist reading to gain a sufficiently complex framework for
pragmatism. What I am suggesting is that the dual framework Burke advocates can be
found in Peirce alone if we take his full semiotic as a general background theory for his
pragmatism.  Peirce  does  this  explicitly  in  1907  in  his  famous  Manuscript  318  (EP2:
398-433) in which he unites his pragmatism with his semiotic in an attempt to explain his
pragmatism and to produce a proof of its adequacy for explicating meaning.24
19 Burke  recommends  that attention  should  be  given  to  “developing  a  Peirce-inspired
pragmatist semantics focusing on actions and sensible effects to replace the standard
empiricist  semantics  that  focuses  on ‘things  and sets’.”  I  have no quarrel  with that.
However, it seems to me that one could with equal earnestness argue that Peirce’s mature
semiotic forms the framework for a pragmatist inferentialist semantics that also needs
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attention – above all, it should be formalized.25 Even more interesting is the possibility of
a hybrid semantics (a pluralist semantics or, simply, a robust semantics) that explicates
the meaning of expressions (or signs of any kind) on a basis that takes account of both
their  inferential  relations  and  use  and  their  representative  relations  to  objects  or
referents of  various kinds.  This may be what Burke is  aiming toward with his  “two-
pronged approach” and it may also be what Peirce was trying to achieve with his mature
realist semiotic.26
20 So  far,  I  have  given  a  very  abbreviated  and  spotty  account  of  Peirce’s  pragmatism
emphasizing the semiotic underpinnings of its mature form. It is well known that it was
not  until  after  James’s  Berkeley  lecture  in  August  1898  that  Peirce  returned  to
pragmatism after a hiatus of twenty years. It is true that in the early 1880’s he had used
his original pragmatism articles as texts for some of his Johns Hopkins courses and had
continued to be guided by his maxim, but he did not take up pragmatism again as an
explicit topic of study until after James caught the interest of the philosophic world in
what it took to be a fresh idea, and publicly gave Peirce the credit. Some commentators
think that, in crediting Peirce, who in 1898 was seriously down on his luck, James was
doing him a favor, hoping to help raise his stock.27 This is supported by the fact that only
a few months after James gave his lecture, he wrote to Peirce asking if he had received
copies of the lecture “wherein I flourished the flag of your principle of Pragmatism?”
Whatever James’s purpose, the groundswell of interest in pragmatism that followed did
create opportunities for Peirce, and pragmatism became the focus for much of his writing
during the final years of his life. Murray Murphey has pointed out that simply by naming
Peirce as the inventor of pragmatism, James compelled him “to decide where he stood not
only on pragmatism itself  but on a wide range of  associated questions.  The results,”
Murphey wrote,  “were a sweeping revision of  [his]  architectonic,  the introduction of
phenomenology and normative science, an extension of [his] theology, and a complete
revision of [his] theory of cognition” (Murphey 1961: 358-9). All of these results would
inform Peirce’s mature pragmatism. Late in 1902 Peirce wrote to James about how his
view of pragmatism was changing and how the “true nature of pragmatism” cannot be
understood without framing it within the context of his categories and the corresponding
normative sciences. He said that only four years earlier, when he gave his 1898 Cambridge
Conferences Lectures, he “had not really got to the bottom of it or seen the unity of the
whole  thing.”28 Eventually,  as  I  have  emphasized,  it  was  in  the  context  of  his  most
advanced theory of signs that Peirce tried to bring his late pragmatism into unity with
the rest of his system of ideas. The result was a pragmatism quite distinct from James’s
and  certainly  more  sophisticated  technically.  Nevertheless,  I  believe  that  Peirce’s
engagement with James’s ideas was a major factor in the growth of his pragmatism. This
is what I will turn to now.
21 I am aware that to select one source of influence from a complex network of factors can
be misleading but James is a special case. He and Peirce had a long history of critiquing
each other’s ideas, sometimes quite sharply but always respectfully.29 A lot of James’s
influence  took  the  form  of  confronting  Peirce  with  ideas  that  were  in  some  ways
compelling but, at the same time, disturbing. Many of the issues that Peirce and James
debated  concerned  perception:  whether  there  are  first  sensations,  whether  we  have
direct  perception  of  spatial  extension,  whether  perception  involves  unconscious
inference, and so on. Peirce and James had long-running disagreements about these and
other issues. It is well-known that James’s conception of pragmatism also disturbed Peirce
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although perhaps less than is usually supposed. It is true that there were elements of
James’s pragmatism that Peirce wanted to distance himself from – he wrote to James in
March 1904 that he and Schiller carried pragmatism too far, but he admitted that “The
humanistic element of pragmatism is very true and important and impressive.” Peirce’s
principal objection was that he doubted that James’s pragmatism could be proved. In
1905, when Peirce announced that he had taken the name “pragmaticism” for his original
form of pragmatism he explained that “[t]he original  view appears […] to be a more
compact and unitary conception than the others. But its capital merit […] is that it more
readily connects itself with a critical proof of its truth” (EP2: 335). Peirce spent a lot of
time between 1902 and 1908 constructing proofs of pragmaticism. But that Peirce never
dissociated himself from pragmatism in the broader sense is clear from a letter he wrote
to Mario Calderoni soon after the name change: “I proposed that the word ‘pragmatism’
should hereafter be used somewhat loosely to signify affiliation with Schiller,  James,
Dewey, Royce, and the rest of us, while the particular doctrine which I invented the word
to  denote  […]  should  be  called  ‘pragmaticism.’  The  extra  syllable  will  indicate  the
narrower meaning” (8.205-206).30 By 1907 Peirce frequently reverted to using the name
“pragmatism” – possibly because he had begun to think of pragmatism in broader terms.
22 To convey some sense of the interplay of ideas between Peirce and James that helped
shape Peirce’s late pragmatism, I’ll run briefly through some examples in chronological
order. In 1887, while Peirce was working on his “A Guess at the Riddle,” his first self-
proclaimed architectonic treatment of philosophy (W6: 166-210), James’s “The Perception
of Space” appeared in four parts in successive issues of Mind (James 1887). In his article,
James objected strongly to the idea of Helmholtz (and Wundt) that “space consciousness”
is the result of unconscious inference and he made a case for direct perception of space
based  on  “first  optical  sensations”  (James  1887:  545-6).  A  year  earlier,  in  his  “The
Perception of Time,” he incorporated E. R. Clay’s idea of “the specious present” and
argued that our “cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain
breadth” and said that  in this  respect  our perception of  time is  analogous with our
perception  of  space:  “the  original  experience  of  both  space  and  time  is  always  of
something already given as a unit […]” (James 1886). But Peirce was a great admirer of
Helmholtz  and  agreed  with  his  so-called  “empiristic”  view  that  perception  involves
unconscious  inference.  Peirce  and  his  student,  Joseph  Jastrow,  had  not  long  before
published the results of an important study they had conducted which supported the
conclusion that perceptual judgments can be influenced by sensations too faint to be
consciously detectable (Peirce & Jastrow 1885). He wrote to James in October 1887 and
raised a muted criticism in support of the Helmholtz account of perception: “I fancy that
all  which  is  present  to  consciousness  is  sensation  &  nothing  assignable  is  a  first
sensation.”31 Nevertheless, he assured James that he had learned much from his work.
From that time on, questions about consciousness and perception would be prominent in
of Peirce’s thought and in the development of his pragmatism. It is difficult to say how
much James’s papers on time and space immediately influenced Peirce but when James’s
Principles of Psychology appeared three years later there is no doubt about its impact on
him.
23 James’s twelve-hundred page Principles was a landmark work, destined to become the
most influential text in the history of American psychology. James worked on his book for
over a decade and it was published in September 1890 to wide acclaim – although there
were a few cautious dissenters. Wilhelm Wundt is known to have proclaimed that “It is
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literature […] it is beautiful, but it is not psychology” (Blumenthal 1970: 238). Peirce was
one  of  only  five  colleagues  James  acknowledged  in  his  preface  for  their  intellectual
companionship. When Principles appeared, Peirce had begun work on his first series of
articles for The Monist, the five papers that would set out his systematic evolutionary
philosophy anticipated in his “Guess at the Riddle,” and he had been working through a
number of issues that James addressed in articles that became chapters of Principles – for
example, that consciousness is not a property of a mere mechanism but is a state of nerve
matter, that “ultimate facts” are illogical, and that feelings spread.32 Peirce was under
enormous pressure to complete a report on gravity for the U.S. Coast & Geodetic Survey
and his definitions for the Century Dictionary, but he hurriedly composed a review of
James’s Principles for The Nation. It was a pretty harsh review, critical of James’s method
and of his reasoning, which Peirce characterized as circular and virtually self-refuting
(W8: 239). Peirce focused especially on James’s claim that the reasoning in perception is
“above-board” and there is no need for intermediary unconscious ideas (James 1890, II:
111).  According  to  Peirce,  James  failed  to  understand  that  what  was  meant  by
“unconscious  inference”  was  only  that  “the  reasoner  is  not  conscious  of  making  an
inference.” More generally, Peirce claimed that James’s methodology was “materialistic
to the core” in supposing that once psychology “has ascertained the empirical correlation
of the various sorts of thought and feeling with definite conditions of the brain,” it can go
no farther. Peirce thought this put James in league with the mechanistic philosophers he
opposed (W8: xlix). But Peirce was not wholly negative; he made a point of saying that the
“directness  and  sharpness”  of  his  objections  should  be  “understood  as  a  tribute  of
respect” and he wrote that James’s Principles was “the most important contribution […]
made to the subject for many years.”
24 Peirce’s Nation review, critical though it was, was the beginning of an engagement with
James’s Principles that continued for at least another seven years. In March 1892 Peirce
wrote a brief notice of James’s abridged edition, taking him to task for his easy acceptance
of “unexamined assumptions.” But two months later in his “The Law of Mind,” the third
paper of Peirce’s first Monist Series, one can see that he had been earnestly confronting
ideas from James’s Principles. Although Peirce expressed his doubt that “we have a feeling
of bigness” he admitted that James might be right in holding that we do (W8: 148). A few
weeks  later  in  “Man’s  Glassy  Essence,”  in  his  discussion  of  habit  formation,  Peirce
brought up James’s idea that habits are related to the plasticity of the materials in which
they inhere. Peirce did not fully endorse James’s account, but his lengthy discussion of
elasticity and habit indicates that James’s ideas were having an impact on the course of
his  thought  (W8:  178).  Habit  formation  would  become  a  critical  issue  for  Peirce’s
metaphysics and for his late pragmatism. In January 1894 Peirce wrote to tell James how
much he liked his distinction between the “substantive and transitive parts of the train of
thought” and that there was nothing in his psychology which served his own purposes
better. Typically, Peirce criticized James for his terminology and suggested that he choose
more appropriate “psychological terms” leaving “grammar-words for logic.”33 But by this
time, Peirce had already made use of James’s distinction in the second article of his 1892
Critic  of  Arguments  series  in  a  discussion  about  how  to  represent  logical  thought
diagrammatically  (3.424),  and  he  would  use  it  again  in  his  1893  “Reply  to  the
Necessitarians” (6.595), and in his 1901 article on “Relatives” for Baldwin’s Dictionary of
Philosophy and Psychology, where he noted that “almost every great step in mathematical
reasoning derives its importance from the fact that it involves an abstraction [whereby]
the transitory elements of thought […] are made substantive elements” (3.642).
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25 Peirce continued to study James’s Principles. There is a notebook from about 1897 in which
Peirce recorded forty-six questions and comments relating to volume one.34 It appears
that  Peirce was using what  he found engaging in James’s  ideas  about  consciousness,
abstraction, and habit to work out a more satisfactory taxonomy of consciousness and to
hone his categories and his theory of inference. Mathias Girel, who has made a close and
excellent study of Peirce’s grapplings with James’s ideas, points to Peirce’s “Questions” as
typical  of  his  treatment  of  James’s  Principles: Peirce  would  acknowledge  interesting
insights on James’s part but would then try to provide the “conceptual tools” necessary
for fully grasping “the phenomenon” under consideration (Girel 2003: 179). It is hard not
to  think  of  Wittgenstein  when  reflecting  on  Peirce’s  long  engagement  with  James’s
Principles. Wittgenstein, too, was strangely attracted to James’s work – it has become part
of our philosophical lore that for some time James’s Principles was the only book to be
found on Wittgenstein’s bookshelves in Cambridge.35 Richard Gale muses that “One gets
the feeling that Wittgenstein wrote his Philosophical Investigations with an open copy of The
Principles of  Psychology before him […]” (Gale 1999:  165).  But,  like Peirce,  Wittgenstein
generally  used  ideas  from  The  Principles  to  illustrate  interesting  problems  which  he
believed James had treated inadequately and even once remarked: “How needed is the
work of philosophy is shown by James’s psychology” (Hilmy 1987: 196-7).  Peirce,  too,
seemed to think that what James’s psychology needed most was sound philosophy. One
wonders if, when in late 1893 Peirce announced his plan for a twelve-volume opus on The
Principles of Philosophy, his idea was to produce a philosophy for James’s psychology.
26 James’s next major work, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, appeared
early in 1897. James dedicated this book “To my old friend, Charles Sanders Peirce, to
whose philosophic comradeship in old times and to whose writings in more recent years I
owe more incitement and help than I can express or repay.” Peirce was moved and wrote
James a reflective letter expressing his appreciation (“it was a truly sweet thing, my dear
William”)  and  then  pointed  out  some  ways  his  thinking  had  been  affected  by  his
experience of “the world of misery” which had been disclosed to him in recent years.
Although rating “higher than ever the individual deed as the only real meaning there is
[in] the Concept,” he now saw “more sharply […] that it is not the mere arbitrary force in
the deed but the life it gives to the idea that is valuable.”36 Peirce praised James’s opening
essay, “The Will to Believe,” for its style and lucidity, but expressed reservations about
the main idea: “our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the
fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced” (James 1897: 1-2). A key
point made by James was that “our non-intellectual nature” influences our convictions.
“Our passional nature,” he wrote, “not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option
between propositions,  whenever  it  is  a  genuine  option that  cannot  by  its  nature  be
decided on intellectual grounds.” Hilary Putnam has called this essay James’s “opening
gun in the war for [his] own ‘Pragmatism’” (Putnam 1992: 56).
27 Peirce’s  response  came  the  following  year  in  his  Cambridge  Conferences  Lectures,
entitled “Reasoning and the Logic of Things,” and arranged for by James to help Peirce
through his difficult times. Peirce’s initial plan was to treat the logic of events, but James
strongly discouraged him from anything too formal: “Now be a good boy and think a
more popular plan out,”  he wrote to Peirce.  “You are teeming with ideas –  and the
lectures need not […] form a continuous whole. Separate topics of a vitally important
character would do perfectly well” (Peirce 1992.2: 25). Peirce replied that he would accept
all of James’s conditions, but he could not help retorting that the “neglect of logic in
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Cambridge is plainly absolute.” Of course Peirce could not restrain himself from putting
some logic into his lectures, and, as is well known, he used the occasion to present a new
theory of the continuum. But, overall, these lectures were quite accessible and were in
large part directed at James and his ideas. Peirce began with a warning that given the
“uncertain condition of philosophy […] any practical applications of it to Religion and
Conduct [are] exceedingly dangerous” (Peirce 1992.2: 108). He went on to make his much
debated distinction between matters  of  vital  importance and matters  concerning the
general advancement of knowledge, a distinction which has been interpreted as creating
a great Peircean divide between applied and pure science,37 and he advanced the idea that
the will to learn is a prerequisite for actually learning – a counterpoint to James’s will to
believe.  But,  disagreements aside,  it  is  notable that Peirce was working in intellectual
territory also occupied by James and was responding to many of his ideas. It is especially
noteworthy that from at least this time on, the role of instinct, or sentiment, as a co-
participant with reason in the acquisition of knowledge became a key concern for Peirce,
and it  would not  be long until  he came to regard ethics  and esthetics  as  normative
prerequisites for logic.
28 Peirce’s Cambridge Conferences lectures were a great success. James wrote to Paul Carus
that though they were “abstruse in parts,” they were “popular and inspiring, and the
whole thing leaving you with a sense that you had just been in the place where ideas are
manufactured,” and he told Juliette Peirce that “everyone [spoke] of [your husband’s
lectures] with the greatest admiration”; James mentioned in particular that Josiah Royce
was “extraordinarily full of appreciation” (Peirce 1992.2: 36). From that time on, Royce’s
writings “began to drift toward Peirce’s ideas” and only five months later James gave his
famous  lecture  at  Berkeley  where  he  introduced  pragmatism  by  name.  Ketner  and
Putnam speculate that “these events in the careers of James and Royce, and in the career
of pragmatism itself […] were influenced by Peirce’s performance” in Cambridge (Peirce
1992.2: 36).
29 I have already described some of the aftermath of James’s Berkeley lecture. Though it
should now be clear that there were a number of factors already at work drawing Peirce
back  to  pragmatism,  there  is  no  doubt  that  James’s  lecture  made  Peirce’s  return
imperative.  By November 1900,  Peirce had begun reformulating his  understanding of
pragmatism for an entry in Baldwin’s Dictionary.38 In his entry, published the following
year,  Peirce  noted  that  in  his  Will  to  Believe  and his  Berkeley  lecture,  James  pushed
pragmatism “to such extremes as must then to give us pause. [He] appears to assume that
the end of man is action” but, on the contrary, Peirce wrote, “action wants an end, and
that […] end must be something of a general description.” Consequently, Peirce said, “the
spirit of the [pragmatic] maxim […] would direct us towards something different from
practical facts, namely, to general ideas, as the true interpreters of our thought.” Thus
“the meaning of [a] concept does not lie in any individual reactions at all,  but in the
manner  in  which  those  reactions  contribute  to  the  development  of  concrete
reasonableness.”
30 Peirce’s  correspondence  with  James  during  this  period  indicates  the  direction  his
pragmatism was taking. On 12 June 1902 he asked James to help him with a point of
psychology:  “what  passes  in  consciousness,  especially  what  emotional  and  irrational
states of feeling, in the course of forming a new belief?” Peirce then took up pragmatism
directly: “Pragmatism is correct doctrine only insofar as it is recognized that irrational
action is the mere husk of ideas. The brute element exists and must not be explained
Peirce’s Post-Jamesian Pragmatism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, III-1 | 2011
12
away as Hegel seeks to do. But the end of thought is action only insofar as the end of
action  is  another  thought.  Far  better  [to]  abandon  the  word  [thought]  and  talk  of
representation  &  then  define  what  kind  of  representation  it  is  that  constitutes
consciousness.” I mentioned earlier Peirce’s November 1902 letter in which he told James
that the “true nature of pragmatism” cannot be understood without framing it within the
context of his categories and the corresponding normative sciences.39 A few days after
that, he wrote again to let James know that his proposal for a grant from the Carnegie
Institution had been turned down and that he was once again in dire straits. He then told
James that, given time, “I think I could satisfy you that your view of pragmatism requires
some modification, that it is the logical basis and proof of it […] and its relation to the
categories that have first to be made clear before it can be accurately applied except in
very simple ways.”40
31 Once again, James came to Peirce’s rescue in his hour of need. He arranged for Peirce to
come to Cambridge to give another course of lectures and, for his topic, Peirce chose
pragmatism.  Peirce  was  immensely  grateful  and wrote to  James: “You are  of  all  my
friends the one who illustrates pragmatism in its most needful forms. You are a jewel of
pragmatism.”41 In  his  seven  Harvard  lectures,  beginning  on  26  March  1903  and
concluding on 17 May, Peirce wanted to put his mark on pragmatism by building a proof
that would draw together most of the strands of his rather rapidly evolving philosophy.42
The  utility  of  the  pragmatic  maxim  does  not  constitute  a  proof,  he  said;  for  that
pragmatism must  pass  through the  fire  of  drastic  analysis.  Peirce  built  his  case  for
pragmatism on a new theory of perception, grounded in his theory of categories and on
results from phenomenology, esthetics, and ethics. He argued that there is a realm of
reality associated with each category and that the reality of thirdness is necessary to
explain a mode of influence on external facts that cannot be explained by mechanical
action alone. He argued that pragmatism is a logical, or semiotic, thesis concerning the
meaning of a particular kind of symbol, the proposition, and explained that propositions
are signs that must refer to their objects in two ways: indexically, by means of subjects,
and iconically, by means of predicates.43 The crucial element of Peirce’s argument, from
the standpoint of his realism, involved the connection between propositional thought and
perception.  To  preserve  his  realism,  Peirce  distinguished  percepts,  which  are  not
propositional, from perceptual judgments, which are, and which are, furthermore, the
“first premisses” of all our reasonings. The process by which perceptual judgments arise
from percepts became a key factor in Peirce’s case. But if perceptual judgments are the
starting  points  for  all  intellectual  development,  then  we  must  be  able  to  perceive
generality. Peirce next argued that abduction shades into perception, so that pragmatism
may be regarded as the logic of abduction, and, finally, he isolated three key points:
32 (1)  that nothing is  in the intellect  that is  not first  in the senses,  (2)  that perceptual
judgments  contain  general  elements,  and  (3)  that  abductive  inference  shades  into
perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them. Pragmatism,
Peirce argued, follows from these propositions.44
33 Peirce  had  succeeded  in  marshalling  much  of  his  growing  system  of  philosophy  in
support of his increasingly rich conception of pragmatism and even had made headway
toward  merging  his  pragmatism with  his  developing  semiotic,  but  his  lectures  were
complicated and difficult to grasp.  James described them as “flashes of brilliant light
relieved against Cimmerian darkness!” He urged Peirce to carry the same line of thought
forward to his  third course of  Lowell  Lectures  scheduled for  the end of  1903 but  to
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confine himself to fewer points and to make one of them abduction (Fisch 1986: 365). In
his Lowell Lectures Peirce again attempted to prove his pragmatism but he spent a lot of
time developing his system of signs and his Existential Graphs. Max Fisch reported that
when Peirce looked back at his Lowell Lectures two years after giving them, what stood
out for him was bringing the normative sciences to bear on pragmatism. Peirce wrote
that: “[I]t seems to me strange that we had to wait until 1903 for any pragmatist to assert
that logic ought to be based upon ethics. Perhaps some one of us had said it before; but I
only know that it was then said in [my] course of lectures before the Lowell Institute in
Boston, and was maintained on the ground that reasoning is thought subjected to self-
control,  and that the whole operation of logical  self-control takes precisely the same
quite  complicated course which everybody ought  to  acknowledge is  that  of  effective
ethical self-control.”45
34 Now, in the interests of bringing this paper to a conclusion, I’ll move quickly through just
a few more examples of Peirce’s evolving pragmatism and conclude with some further
thoughts about James’s influence. I have already mentioned Peirce’s 1905 paper, “What
Pragmatism Is,” in which he announced the new name, pragmaticism, for his narrower
variant of pragmatism. That paper was the first article of a series on pragmatism that he
had agreed to write for The Monist. Peirce decided he would use the opportunity to finally
get his proof of pragmatism (now pragmaticism) into print. In this first article Peirce
made the interesting point that “while the pragmaticist regards Thirdness as an essential
ingredient of reality, it can only govern through action, and action cannot arise except in
feeling. It is the dependence of Thirdness on action (Secondness) and feeling (Firstness)
that  distinguishes  pragmaticism from the absolute  idealism of  Hegel.”  In  the second
article of  the series,  “Issues of  Pragmaticism,” Peirce restated his  maxim in semiotic
terms but devoted most of the paper to a consideration of critical common-sensism and
scholastic  realism.  He  extended  his  realism  to  include  “real  vagues”  and  “real
possibilities,” writing that “it is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most
concerned to insist upon.” Fisch described the pragmaticism presented in this article as
pragmatism “purged of the nominalistic dross of its original exposition.” In a third article
that was never published, Peirce developed his phaneroscopy and his doctrine of the
valency of  concepts  as  a  basis  for  his  proof,  but  along the  way he  decided that  his
Existential Graphs would provide a better basis so for his third article he substituted an
explication of his Graphs. That article, “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism,”
didn’t appear until October 1906 and it was the final instalment – the series was never
completed and Peirce’s proof based on his Existential Graphs was never published.46
35 Peirce’s final extended exposition of pragmatism is the famous Manuscript 318, begun as
a “letter to the editor” for the Nation but expanded into a lengthy article that also was
never published during Peirce’s lifetime. There are many fragments and variants of this
1907  paper  in  which  Peirce  finally  managed  to  fully  explicate  his  pragmatism  in  a
semiotic framework and to complete a proof based on that explication. His proof began
with the premiss that every concept and every thought beyond immediate perception is a
sign, and concluded with the proposition that a final logical interpretant must be of the
nature of a habit. “But how,” Peirce asked, can a habit be described other “than by a
description of  the kind of  action to which it  gives rise,  with the specification of  the
conditions and of the motive?” Peirce claimed that this is the very kernel of pragmatism
which he  expressed succinctly  by  saying that  the  “whole  meaning of  an intellectual
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predicate is that certain kinds of events would happen, once in so often, in the course of
experience, under certain kinds of existential circumstances” (EP2: 402).47
36 The following year, 1908, Peirce wrote up his “Neglected Argument for the Reality of God”
for The Hibbert Journal.48 For his argument, Peirce elaborated on why our “instinct” for
guessing – Galileo’s il lume naturale – is so successful. At the end of his paper, Peirce made
a connection with pragmatism (or pragmaticism, for he had gone back to using that
name).  Peirce  concluded  that  “man,  like  any  other  animal,  is  gifted  with  power  of
understanding sufficient for the conduct of life. This brings him,” Peirce says, “for testing
the hypothesis [that God is real], to taking a stand upon Pragmaticism, which implies
faith in common-sense and in instinct, though only as they issue from the cupel-furnace
of measured criticism” (EP2: 445-6).  Peirce’s late use of pragmaticism in support of a
religious hypothesis is strangely reminiscent of James’s original use of pragmatism in his
Berkeley lecture.
37 In reflecting on the intellectual companionship of Peirce and James and on the influence
James  had  on  the  course  of  Peirce’s  thought,  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  their
differences. Hilary Putnam has pointed to “the enormous difference in their underlying
metaphysical assumptions,” and more-or-less sums up these differences by pointing out
that Peirce could not tolerate James’s nominalism and that James’s had no room in his
philosophy for Peirce’s  Thirdness (Putnam, 1997:  179).  These are indeed fundamental
disagreements.  In  his  excellent  article  in  The  Cambridge  Companion  to  William  James, 
Christopher Hookway gives a detailed account of how Peirce’s and James’s pragmatisms
differ and why their differences, which run throughout their philosophies as a whole,
stem  from  differing  purposes  (Hookway  1997:  145-65).  Although  he  doesn’t  say  it
straightforwardly, it seems that Hookway believes that the very different characters of
Peirce and James are reflected in their pragmatisms, and I think this too. Perhaps this is
most  evident  in  James’s  anti-intellectualism  and  Peirce’s  insistence  that  just  about
everything be viewed through the lens of logic. Their different characters might also be
seen in James’s frequent nagging of Peirce to write for the common man and Peirce’s
frustration over James’s indifference to formalisms and analysis.  James tended to see
things in broad outlines, almost as though he were trusting more to his feelings than his
intellect. When he wrote to Peirce to say how much he had enjoyed his Monist article,
“The Doctrine of Necessity Examined,” he said that he believed “in that sort of thing”
himself but that even if he didn’t “it would be a blessed piece of radicalism” (W8: lxxxi).
James liked Peirce’s article for its general thrust regardless of its specifics. Peirce tended
to read James with an analytical magnifier in hand, looking for faults.
38 But  we  must  also  remember  that  Peirce  never  completely  renounced  the  broader
Jamesian view of pragmatism and always believed there was some common ground that
he shared with the Jamesian pragmatists. Peirce set out on a narrow path when he chose
to limit his pragmatism, or pragmaticism, to that exclusive set of principles and ideas that
could undergird and facilitate a proof of his maxim in an acceptable form. Clearly this
was sound practice and it led Peirce to a refined architectonic philosophy that may one
day be distinguished as one of the great intellectual achievements of humanity. As Peirce
repeatedly remarked, his pragmaticism realigned pragmatism with its beginnings in the
old Metaphysical Club. Louis Menand has pointed out that what the original pragmatists
had in common was “an idea about ideas. They all believed that ideas […] are tools […]
that people devise to cope with the world in which they find themselves” (Menand 2001:
xi). This takes cognition to be a serious business, more or less a matter of survival. But, as
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Peirce taught in his Cambridge Conferences Lectures, we are not always in the survival
mode, dealing with matters of vital importance. It is true that Peirce’s early pragmatism,
based on his  doubt/belief  theory  of  inquiry  (Peirce 1877-78),  accords  with Menand’s
characterization, while in its later form, Peirce’s pragmatism shifted more toward a focus
on logical thought than on the conduct of life; but even from the beginning Peirce’s focus
was on conceptual clarity and fidelity and his method tended toward formal analysis. Yet
is it possible that, in the end, Peirce could not so staunchly resist the siren song of James’s
less rigid pragmatism?
39 As his life drew toward its close, Peirce remarked that his pragmatism was useful for
making reasoning more secure but that it “does not bestow a single smile upon beauty,
upon moral virtue, or upon abstract truth; – the three things that alone raise Humanity
above Animality” (EP2: 465). This was not a repudiation of his logical pragmatism, nor an
embrace of James’s more humanistic pragmatism, but it is clearly an indication of the
increased strength of Peirce’s aesthetic and humanistic interests. In his recent book on
pragmatism, Bernstein refers to two of James’s essays which best express the deep ethical
and humanistic underpinnings of his thought: “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings”
and “What Makes Life Worth Living?” (Bernstein 2010: 61). Both of those essays appeared
in James’s 1899 book, Talks to Teachers. Late in 1910, after James’s death, Juliette Peirce
wrote to Alice James that her husband “has not been the same since the loss of his earliest
and best friend” and asked her if she would please send Charles a copy of James’s Talks to
Teachers, which he had never read but now wanted to.49 Of course this does not prove that
Peirce was gravitating to a more multifaceted pragmatism, but it is testament to the
attraction Peirce continued to feel for James and his work and it is suggestive of a turn in
Peirce’s thought toward more humanistic concerns. The friendship of Peirce and James,
and their engagement with each other’s thought, is one of the great stories of classical
American philosophy.
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NOTES
1. James’s  lecture,  “Philosophical  Conceptions  and  Practical  Results,”  was  printed  in  the
University of California Chronicle, September 1898, 287-310, and was widely circulated as a separate
pamphlet. It was re-printed, with some omissions, in James 1904. For a discussion of the response
engendered by James’s paper see Fisch 1977.
2. Juliette Peirce to Gifford Pinchot, 4 September 1934, quoted in Ketner (1998: 275-6).
3. In  1878  the  United  States  Coast  Survey  was  renamed the  United  States  Coast  & Geodetic
Survey.
4. References to Peirce’s writings will be made following standard practice. References to the
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (8 vols., Harvard University Press, 1931-58) are given in
decimal notation: for example, (1.444) refers to vol. 1, paragraph 444. References to the Writings of
Charles S.  Peirce:  A Chronological  Edition (Indiana University Press, 1982-) give volume and page
numbers: for example, W8: 205 refers to vol. 8, p. 205. References to The Essential Peirce (2 vols.,
Indiana University Press, 1992, 1998) give volume and page numbers: for example, EP2: 200 refers
to vol. 2, p. 200. References to Peirce’s manuscripts are given according to the Robin Catalogue of
the Peirce Papers in the Houghton Library at Harvard University (Annotated Catalogue of the Papers
of Charles S. Peirce, University of Massachusetts Press, 1967).
5. See, for example, Margolis 2002, and 2010. Margolis, whose recent writings have focused on
the key role he thinks a third wave of pragmatism will  play in reunifying philosophy across
national boundaries, admires both James and Peirce for their original, even radical, ideas, though
he singles out John Dewey as having made the greatest contribution to classical pragmatism.
Margolis  seems inclined to view what he calls  the second wave of pragmatism, initiated and
energized by the writings and debates of Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam, as a decided advance
over classical pragmatism which it appropriately eclipsed (Margolis 2002: 12). Accordingly, he
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applauds  the  resolution  of  neopragmatist  Robert  Brandom,  Rorty’s  student,  to  look  for
inspiration  in  Kant  and  Hegel  instead  of  in  the  classical  pragmatists.  In  fact  it  seems  that,
increasingly, Hegel has become the focal point of Margolis’s philosophical outlook and it is not
entirely clear why he thinks that the coming philosophy should be thought of as the third wave
of pragmatism instead of as a fusion of pragmatism with analytical and continental schools of
thought.
6. See  Bernstein  2010,  especially  chap.  1,  for  an  excellent  account  of  Peirce’s  anti-Cartesian
program that laid the groundwork for his pragmatism.
7. Joseph Margolis exhibits this tendency and it is surely true of Robert Brandom.
8. See, for example, Houser 2003.
9. See Burke 2010 and, especially, his forthcoming book, On What Pragmatism Was.
10. One  must  not  suppose  that  this  two-pronged  approach  is  merely  a  joining  of  forces  of
empiricism with rationalism – James, of course, would be chagrined to think he might be thought
to be a rationalist. The extent to which Burke’s arguments will prove convincing remains to be
seen since his ideas have only been sketched in papers and talks and his book on the subject has
not yet appeared.
11. Hookway,  however,  argues  that  the  pragmatisms  of  Peirce  and  James  are  quite  distinct
because they held very different views about the purpose of pragmatism (Hookway 1997: 145-65).
12. Burke develops this fully in his forthcoming On What Pragmatism Was.
13. It was preceded by “The Fixation of Belief,” which Peirce intended to be the first part of a
two-part article. Both of these pragmatism papers were part of a larger work, “Illustrations of
the Logic of Science” (Peirce 1877-78).
14. For example: Bentley to Bridgman, 3 February 1950, Lilly Library, Indiana University.
15. Bernstein remarked on the importance of these early papers in his 1988 presidential address
to the American Philosophical Association where he claimed that there is no important argument
in the present-day anti-foundationalist arsenal that Peirce had not anticipated (Bernstein 1989).
16. See also Bernstein (2010: 226-7, n.12). In a recent article on Brandom and Peirce, Cathy Legg
carefully  examined  Peirce’s  1868  anti-intuitionism  and  compared  it  with  Brandom’s
inferentialism.  Legg  concluded that  in  some respects  Peirce  had  succeeded in  formulating  a
clearer and more thoroughgoing inferentialism than Brandom’s (Legg 2008: 105). We must be
careful,  though, not to attribute too radical an inferentialism to Peirce and to remember his
antipathy to rationalism (for example, see 1.631). Legg notes that an important precursor to the
debate  over  inferentialism was  played out  in  the  19th century  in  the  great  intuition debate
between  John  Stuart  Mill  and  Sir  William  Hamilton,  and  their  followers.  The  Mill-Hamilton
debate concerned whether,  or  to what extent,  we have intuitive,  or  unmediated,  knowledge;
Hamilton  was  for  and  Mill  was  against  intuitions.  (See  Legg  (2008:  111-3).  Note  that  she
references  Smyth 1997 as  her  source for  the Mill-Hamilton debate.)  Peirce’s  1868 arguments
against intuitive cognition grew out of the Mill-Hamilton debate.
17. Morton  White  made  the  suggestion  that  Peirce’s  operational  treatment  of  meaning,
expressed is statements of the form “if operation O […] then experience E will result,” can be
used by James as well “if acceptance of belief of a statement is admissible as an operation, and
satisfaction is admissible as an experience” (Flower & Murphey 1977: 676).
18. Peirce’s preferred spelling of “semiosis” and “semiotic” was “semeiosis” and “semeiotic.” For
this paper I’ll follow the common practice of spelling these words without the extra e.
19. Sometimes he used different names.
20. For this division, too, he sometimes used different names. See “Sundry Logical Conceptions”
(EP2: Sel.20).
21. See “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (EP2: Sel. 21).
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22. By 1906, he had come to hold the view that without a shared understanding of the right sort a
sign could not “fulfill its function” and there could be no communication between utterer and
interpreter (EP2: 478).
23. Peirce’s  use  of  the  word  “speculative”  was  intended  to  associate  his  three  branches  of
semiotic with the medieval trivium – grammar, logic, and rhetoric – but he used different names
and never quite settled on a preferred set.
24. See  also  Peirce’s  1905  paper,  “Issues  of  Pragmaticism”  (EP2:  sel.  25),  where  he  began
developing a semiotic account of his pragmatism.
25. Perhaps we could say that in some respects Peirce already achieved a quasi-formalization of
his semiotic. Peirce’s Existential Graphs might be made to contribute to this formalization, or
perhaps they can provide an alternative framework for an inferentialist semantics.
26. For systematic accounts of Peirce’s mature semiotics see Liszka 1996, and Short 2007.
27. See, for example, Murphey (1961: 358) and the introduction to Menand 1997.
28. Peirce to James, 25 Nov. 1902, James Papers, Houghton Library.
29. This was not always understood by others.  See my remarks in Houser 2010.2 concerning
Peirce’s review of James’s Principles.
30. My emphasis. See, also, Houser 2010.3.
31. Peirce to James, 27 Oct. 1887, James Papers, Houghton Library.
32. To compare Peirce’s work with James’s, see, for example, Principles of Psychology, 1, 588ff. Note
that much of “The Stream of Thought” had been published in Mind in 1884 under the title “On
Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology” (James 1884).
33. Peirce to James, 1 January 1894, James Papers, Houghton Library. Peirce tried more than once
to  convince  James  to  replace  “substantive”  and “transitive”  with  “sessile”  and “volatile”  or,
better  yet,  with  “pteroentic”  and “apteroenic”  with  a  nod to  the  “winged”  and “unwinged”
words of Homer.
34. This notebook, or some of the questions in it, could have been written earlier, perhaps as
early  as  1894.  See  Girel  (2003:  178-89),  for  an  excellent  account  and  discussion  of  Peirce’s
questions and answers and their relation to Peirce’s ongoing philosophical work. Many of
Peirce’s  questions  and comments  referred to  Chapter  VIII,  “The relations  of  Minds  to  Other
Things” and Chapter IX, “The Stream of Thought.”
35. See Goodman 2007, especially p. 61.
36. Peirce to James, 13 March 1897, James Papers, Houghton Library.
37. For some discussion of Peirce’s treatment of this distinction see Houser (2010.4: 2-5).
38. Peirce to James, 10 November 1900, James Papers, Houghton Library.
39. Peirce to James, 25 Nov. 1902, James Papers, Houghton Library.
40. Peirce to James, 1 Dec. 1902, James Papers, Houghton Library. Peirce remarked to James that
pragmatism “can receive no sound support from psychology.”
41. Peirce to James, 10 March 1903, James Papers, Houghton Library.
42. See  Hookway 2005  and 2008  and Turrisi’s  introduction  to  Peirce  1997  for  discussions  of
Peirce’s  attempt  to  prove  pragmatism  in  his  Harvard  Lectures  on  Pragmatism.  Hookway,
especially,  in  these papers  and in ongoing work is  building a  case for  a  1903 proof,  and for
subsequent proofs, that is generally consistent with but significantly different than the proofs I
sketched in Houser 1998.
43. Propositions as described here are a class of signs that Peirce would later call dicent symbols.
T. L. Short  argues that  in another,  and for  him, preferred,  sense,  propositions are hypostatic
abstractions  “from  a  set  of  (in  some  respect  equivalent)  replications  (actual  or  possible)  of
diverse dicent  symbols”  and not  really  signs at  all  (Short  2007:  245).  See Peirce’s  third 1903
Harvard Lecture (EP2: 160-78), for a discussion of the meaning of “proposition” in the context of
his argument for pragmatism.
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44. This sketch of Peirce’s 1903 proof is taken from Houser (1998: xxv-xxvi). See p. xxxiv-xxxv for
a different rendering of Peirce’s 1903 proof. For some elaboration of Peirce’s view of the role of
propositional judgment in perception see Houser 2005, and 2007.
45. Fisch (1986: 365-6); the quotation is from 5.533.
46. For recent work on Peirce’s  attempt to use EG as a basis  for a proof of  pragmatism, see
Pietarinen & Snellman 2006, and Pietarinen 2008.
47. See Houser (1998: xxxv-xxxvi), for some discussion of this proof.
48. In  this  paper  (Peirce  1908),  Peirce  distinguished  between  an  argument,  “any  process  of
thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief,” and an argumentation, “an argument
proceeding upon definitely formulated premisses” (EP2: 435).
49. Juliette Peirce to Alice James, 1 November 1910, Max H. Fisch Papers. The date written on the
letter does not include the year but Fisch has guessed that it was written in 1910, about two
months after James’s death.
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